Since the deployment of the relayer registry in proposal #10, we have seen an additional utility for the protocol’s native governance token, allowing a hedge for stakeholders to accrue a percentage of protocol cashflows. This is executed by requiring relayers whom wish to be listed on the frontend to stake a balance into the registry, which a percentage (currently configured to 0.3%) is deducted whenever a withdrawal is processed to be distributed to active stakeholders in the governance contract. This action is only enforced when relayers process a withdrawal through the router, and not to the instance contracts directly.
Although since the time of such feature deployment, the market evaluation of the governance token has decreased significiantly - falling approximately 90% in value - maintaining justifiable thresholds for relayer operation is important for equitable participation. Otherwise the cost to deploy multiple relayers to game the randomisation logic for selection on the frontend is insignificant to the profit obtained from doing so.
Additionally as of late, we have see a number of relayers attempt to game the system by modifying the relayer client source code to evade the router and process withdrawals to instance contracts directly - while still being listed on the frontend - and not having to face deductions from their staked balance. While this does not effect the intended logic of the core protocol, it goes against the canon and requirements of being a relayer listed on the registry.
As requested by multiple community actors, this proposition enacts on two operations:
- increases the registry’s listing minimum staking amount to 2000 TORN from 300 TORN
- penalises the following relayers whom have been witnessed to evade the router, by reseting their staked balances to zero:
Additionally to these changes the frontend logic to select relayers has been modified so each relayer must have a minimum balance of at least 500 TORN instead of the previous configuration of 40 TORN, making evading the router again costly if penalisation was to occur.
While this proposal does not address the long terms problem of modifying relayer software through build attestation, it sets percendents that misbehaviour is not tolerated.